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ABSTRACT. A public finance framework is used to examine the relationship between community composition, 
namely occupancy status, and the provision of governmental services. A comprehensive literature survey suggests that a 
systematic relationship exists between the fraction of renters in a given jurisdiction and the level of fiscal expenditures. 
More particularly, it would appear that renters ceteris paribus are willing to support a higher level of publicly provided 
goods than homeowners. The competing hypotheses of renter illusion and renter rationality are discussed, as are the 
differing implications for public policy. Suggestions are also made on how future research on this important topic might 
proceed.  
INTRODUCTION 
Australian local governments have found themselves increasingly responsible for the provision of 
economic and social services within their jurisdictions. As the debate on the efficient and equitable 
provision and financing of these publicly provided “goods” has developed, so too has the issue on 
how community preferences are translated into actual fiscal outcomes. One issue that has received 
some attention is the role of community composition in this process. That is, how do the 
characteristics of a given community - such as income, ethnicity and educational level - influence 
the demand for and level of public good provision. Furthermore, does a prima facie case exist for 
state and local governments to take this into account when allocating funding and making 
expenditure decisions. In this regard, a contribution by the established public finance literature may 
offer some insight into aspects of this process. 
Firstly, numerous studies in public finance have favoured what is termed “the median voter 
model”.1 This remarkably robust empirical tool is an attempt to apply the same principles of 
demand estimation found in conventional economics to the provision of governmental services. To 
do so, one recognises that the demand for these “public goods” is formulated in part by voting 
patterns, not just individual preferences. Furthermore, identifying that level of preference for public 
goods which engenders the most voting support will also identify the level of preferred demand. 
Advocates of the median voter model have argued that is the median preference for public goods, as 
personified by the median voter, that will decide such outcomes. Therefore, once this median voter 
is suitably defined we may attempt to construct a demand function for public goods consistent with 
the assumptions of  Neoclassical economics. 
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Secondly, the main technique used in this type of analysis is to regress governmental 
expenditure against sets of demographic and socio-economic characteristics; those that are assumed 
to proxy the individual preferences of the median voter. These usually include variables such as 
income, age, educational level and taxes. And in general, these studies have supported the 
considerable evidence that already exists "...suggesting that the composition of the community - 
that is, the characteristics of the residents themselves - plays a central role in determining levels of 
important public outputs" (Schwab and Oates, 1991, p. 217). Moreover, they have also been 
successful in assessing the impact of political agents, grants and revenue structure, amongst other 
factors, on the scale and scope of governmental expenditures (Holtz-Eakin, 1992, p. 17).2  
 Thirdly, one persistent finding of many of these studies has been the apparent systematic 
relationship that exists between the occupancy status of a community's residents as a whole and the 
level of expenditure on publicly provided goods (Barr and Davis, 1966; Bergstrom and Goodman, 
1973; Peterson, 1975; Gronberg, 1980; Schwab and Zampelli, 1987; Heyndels and Smolders, 
1994).3 More particularly, where a measure identifying the proportion of renters (or homeowners) is 
included in a typical regression, an increase (increase) in the dominance of this sub-group is 
associated with an increase (decrease) in the level of expenditure, either in per capita or aggregate 
terms.4 Put differently, ceteris paribus  "...jurisdictions with a relatively large fraction of renters 
tend to spend more per capita on local public services" (Oates, 1988, p. 72). To account for this 
peculiar finding, a number of theoretical constructs have been proposed and duly tested in the 
literature. First, the concept of "renter illusion" - the systematic misperception of fiscal parameters - 
has been advocated. Studies by  Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), Peterson (1975), Lovell (1978), 
Gronberg (1980), Heyndels and Smolders (1994) and Dollery and Worthington (1995) have dealt 
with this concept. Second, more recent literature has been concerned with a model of "renter 
rationality" - that renters correctly perceive their own relevant fiscal parameters. Studies by Barr 
and Davis (1966), Hanushek (1975), Martinez-Vazquez (1983), Schokkaert (1987), Moomau and 
Morton (1992) and Carroll and Yinger (1994) have been directed to the analysis of this proposition. 
Finally, a model that relies on neither misperception nor accurate assessment of fiscal parameters in 
explaining renter behaviour has received some attention. Martinez-Vazquez and Sjoquist (1988) 
provide support for this proposal. It is to the survey of these alternative hypotheses, and a brief 
policy analysis, that the present study is directed.5 
The paper itself is divided into three main areas. The first section provides a comprehensive 
survey of the three alternative hypotheses of renter behaviour. In particular, the section outlines the 
impact of the hypotheses on the demand for publicly provided goods, and the level of associated 
fiscal expenditures. The limitations of these types of analysis are also discussed in this section, with 
particular attention directed to future research directions. A section is then included on appropriate 
policy prescriptions under alternative assumptions and observations. The paper ends with some 
brief concluding remarks.  
MODELS OF RENTER BEHAVIOUR 
 3
The study of renter behaviour has generally been formulated within the construct of a median voter 
framework. In general, the studies have been concerned with the systematic impact of renters on 
actual fiscal outcomes (Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973; Lovell, 1978; Gronberg, 1980; Heyndels 
and Smolders, 1994; Dollery and Worthington, 1995), though several are directed at renter's 
attitudes or perceptions of relevant fiscal parameters (Peterson, 1975; Hanushek, 1975; Martinez-
Vazquez, 1983; Schokkaert, 1987). As shown in Table 1, approaches to the provision of publicly 
provided goods, whether directly or indirectly concerned with the issue of renter behaviour, consist 
of three components. First, the selection of a suitable proxy for the provision of the public good, in 
most instances satisfied by governmental expenditure, aggregate or per capita. Second, the use of 
selected "taste" variables to model the characteristics of the median voter, such as income and age 
distribution, tax shares, educational level, population densities and so on. Generally these are 
thought of "in the context of the assumed model...as affecting either the budget constraint or the 
objective function of the median voter" (Holtz-Eakin, 1992, p.18). Finally, studies of renter 
behaviour have included a measure of the potential impact of renters on median voter outcomes.6 
Usually this is composed of the proportion of the jurisdictional population either renting (Martinez-
Vazquez, 1983; Moomau and Morton, 1992; Heyndels and Smolders, 1994) or purchasing/owning 
(Hanushek, 1975; Gronberg, 1980; Beck, 1984; Brazer and McCarty, 1987; Schwab and Zampelli, 
1987; Dollery and Worthington, 1995) their residence, though the use of dummy variables for 
occupancy status is not unknown (Peterson, 1975; Schokkaert, 1987). It is to the latter issue and its 
theoretical underpinnings, that the paper itself is directed.  
 
TABLE 1. 
Summary of major studies of renter behaviour 
Author(s) Data  
(a) 
Method 
(b) 
Dependent 
Variable (c) 
Occupancy 
Variable (d) 
Other Independent Variables 
(d) 
Relevant Findings 
Barr and 
Davis (1966) 
64 Penn-
sylvanian 
municipal 
areas 
Cross-
sectional 
1959 
OLS Per capita 
general, 
highway, 
judicial and 
other 
expenditures. 
Percentage 
of electorate 
owning 
property. 
Per capita assessed property 
value. 
Property holding an 
important determinant 
of expenditure 
decisions. 
Bergstrom 
and Goodman 
(1973) 
826 US 
municipal 
areas 
Cross-
sectional 
1962 
OLS 
(log-
linear) 
Total 
expenditures 
on police, 
parks and total 
excluding 
education and 
welfare. 
Percentage  
of municipal 
housing 
owner 
occupied. 
Number of households, tax 
share of median voter, median 
income, measure of the 
crowding of the public good, 
percentage population change, 
percentage non-white,  of 
population > 65, population 
density. 
Negative and 
significant coefficient 
between percentage 
owner occupied and 
the level of general 
expenditures. 
Hanushek 
(1975) 
140 
Cleveland 
precincts  
Cross-
sectional 
1960 
OLS Probability of 
voter turnout, 
probability of 
voting in 
favour of 
expenditure 
increase. 
Percent 
homes 
owner-
occupied. 
Median income, value of owner-
occupied dwelling, gross rent, 
ethnic breakdown, educational 
level, age level. 
Homeowners tend to 
vote more readily 
against increases in 
public expenditure. 
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Peterson 
(1975) 
School 
districts in 
California 
Michigan 
N. Jersey  
N. York 
Kansas 
Cross-
sectional 
1968-71  
OLS 
(log-log) 
Desired school 
spending per 
pupil. 
Percentage 
of adult 
renters in 
school 
district. 
Dummy 
variable for 
renter status.
Household income, property tax 
base value divided by property 
value per pupil, state aid per 
pupil, number of school 
children in household. 
The rental population 
of an area is 
associated with the 
demand for higher 
public service levels. 
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Author(s) Data  
(a) 
Method 
(b) 
Dependent 
Variable (c) 
Occupancy 
Variable (d) 
Other Independent Variables 
(d) 
Relevant Findings 
Lovell (1978) 136 
Connect-
icut towns 
Cross-
sectional 
1970 
OLS 
GLS 
(linear 
and log-
linear) 
Educational 
expenditure 
per pupil. 
Proportion 
of homes 
owner-
occupied in 
town. 
Percentage of population in 
poverty, median family income, 
skewness of income distribution, 
property per pupil, median 
school years, enrolments, 
percentage of Democrat voters. 
Expenditures 
negatively related to 
the level of owner 
occupied housing. 
Gronberg 
(1980) 
83 Chicago 
localities 
Cross-
sectional 
1970 
OLS, 
TSLS 
Total 
municipal 
expenditures. 
Percentage 
owner 
occupied in 
local  area. 
Labour force participation rate, 
percentage of non-whites, per 
capita assessed value of 
property, median voter income, 
median voter tax share. 
Proportion of owner 
occupied negatively 
related to level of 
expenditures. 
Martinez-
Vazquez 
(1983) 
Sundry 
St Louis 
precincts  
Cross-
sectional 
1974 
OLS "Yes" votes on 
increased 
expenditures 
in police, fire, 
parks, 
highway, 
library. 
Net benefits of 
increased 
expenditures. 
Percentage 
of renters in 
precinct. 
 
Median income. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Higher proportion of 
"yes" votes 
attributable to high 
rates of renter 
occupation. Results 
also suggest that "yes" 
votes on the behalf of 
renters are rational 
rather than illusionary. 
Beck  
(1984) 
219 
California 
municipal 
areas 
Cross-
sectional 
1971-74 
NLLS Per capita total 
expenditure. 
Percent of 
owner-
occupied 
housing. 
Per capita grant aid, tax base 
per household, per capita sales 
tax revenue, median family 
income, percentage non-white, 
percentage over 65 years, 
population, Gini coefficient. 
Demand for municipal 
services is a nonmono- 
tonic function of 
income, with 
minimum varying 
across communities. 
Brazer and 
McCarty 
(1987) 
600 
Connec- 
ticut New 
Jersey 
Virginia 
districts 
Cross-
sectional 
1981-82 
OLS  
(log-
linear) 
School 
expenditure 
per pupil. 
Municipal 
expenditure 
per capita. 
Proportion 
of owner-
occupiers. 
Tax price, state and federal aid, 
proportion aged, education, 
poverty ratio, enrolment rates, 
population growth and density, 
nonresident and resident pupils, 
urbanisation. 
Coefficient on owner-
occupier negative and 
significant. 
Schokkaert 
(1987) 
2404 
persons in 
Purrs, 
Belgium 
1986 
Logit Probability of 
favouring 
increase in 
expenditure. 
Dummy 
variable for 
home-
ownership. 
Dummy variables for age, 
unemployment, urban status, 
job description, sports activity; 
measures of age, education, sex, 
income, tax. 
Homeowners appear 
more favourable to 
increases in 
expenditure. 
Schwab and 
Zampelli 
(1987) 
73 
Maryland 
cities and 
counties 
Cross-
sectional 
1978 
NLLS Per capita 
police 
expenditure. 
Proportion 
of owner-
occupiers. 
Per capita income, price, 
grants, percentage non-white, 
unemployed, high school 
graduates.  
No relationship 
between percentage of 
homeowners and 
police expenditure. 
Moomau and 
Morton 
(1992) 
428 New 
Orleans 
precincts 
Cross-
sectional 
1982 
Logit Probability of 
voting in 
favour of 
change in 
property tax. 
Percentage 
of renter  
and 
homeowner 
households. 
Income, rental  contract value, 
percentage white, percentage 
black, homestead exemption 
value.  
The higher the value 
of rent the more likely 
renters will perceive 
the tax burden. 
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Author(s) Data  
(a) 
Method 
(b) 
Dependent 
Variable (c) 
Occupancy 
Variable (d) 
Other Independent Variables 
(d) 
Relevant Findings 
Heyndels and 
Smolders 
(1994) 
302 
Flemish 
municipal 
areas 
Cross-
sectional  
1990 
OLS  
(log-
linear) 
Total 
expenditure. 
Percentage 
of non-
owner 
occupied 
residences. 
Population, median voter tax 
share, median voter total 
disposable income, measure of 
revenue-complexity, income 
elasticity measure, grant income 
equivalent divided by total 
income. 
No relationship 
between occupancy 
status and expenditure 
outcomes. 
Carroll and 
Yinger 
(1994) 
147 Boston 
towns 
Cross-
sectional 
1980 
OLS, 
TSLS, 
Box-
Cox. 
Median rents, 
index of public 
service 
quality, tax 
rate. 
Fraction of 
rental 
housing 
units. 
Rental characteristics, 
population density, distance to 
CBD/highway, population 
growth rate. 
Property tax increases 
are exactly off-set by 
increases in rents. 
Provides support for 
renter rationality. 
Dollery and 
Worthington  
(1995) 
46 
Australian 
LGAs 
Cross-
sectional 
1991 
OLS 
TSLS 
(linear 
and log-
linear) 
Total and per 
capita 
expenditure. 
Proportion 
of owner-
occupied 
homes in 
local 
government 
area. 
Rateable area and roads, 
median voter tax price, income, 
population, proportion of 
population over 65 years, 
measure of revenue-complexity, 
dummies for grant and utility  
reliance, ndirectness of revenue 
system. 
Proportion owner-
occupied and 
expenditure negatively 
related. 
a) Singular dates represent cross-sectional studies - where two dates are given, different years for some cross-sectional variables 
have been used. b) OLS/GLS/TSLS/NLLS - Ordinary Least Squares, Generalised Least Squares, Two-Stage Least Squares and 
Non-Linear Least Squares respectively. c) More than one dependent variable indicates alternative equations have been evaluated. 
d) Italicised independent variables indicate significant t-values at 90% or more. 
 
Renter Illusion 
The first renter behaviour hypothesis that has received attention in the public finance literature is 
that of renter illusion (Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973; Hanushek, 1975; Peterson, 1975; Gronberg, 
1980; Schokkaert, 1987; Moomau and Morton, 1992; Heyndels and Smolders, 1994; Dollery and 
Worthington, 1995). In this approach, an increase in the proportion of renters in a given jurisdiction 
will ceteris paribus  increase the level of expenditures. The presumption is that since the primary 
revenue of local governments is the property tax, only those voters directly levied (owners) will 
correctly perceive the tax-price of the public good - it would appear that higher taxes are "hidden" 
in rental payments.7 Whilst we could expect that higher property taxes will be passed onto renters 
via higher rents, the illusionary hypothesis argues that a disjunction exists between a rental voter's 
perception of the level of public good services and the level of rents paid (Oates, 1988, p. 72). Even 
if the illusionary influence is not perfect, so long as the actual tax-price is underestimated, rental 
voters will support higher levels of public expenditure and therefore bias expenditures upwards 
(Oates, 1988, p. 72).  
The first empirical study of renter illusion was undertaken by Bergstrom and Goodman in 
1973. Bergstrom and Goodman (1973, p. 283) argued that whilst some variables incorporated in 
expenditure analysis were fairly uniformly applied across a jurisdiction, the inclusion of owner-
occupied ratios would account for those sections of a given population with a similar income who 
paid a different tax share. Moreover, the study asserted that "...it may be that renters do not believe 
that they pay the entire property tax on their housing, and tend to vote for more public 
expenditures" as support for the significantly negative sign found on proportion of owner-occupied 
housing (Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973, p. 289). 
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Subsequent to the seminal argument of Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), several studies 
verified the persistence of renter illusion in the tax price-rent nexus. Peterson (1975, p. 110) found 
that "...renters do not perceive themselves as bearing the full costs of the property tax...[indeed] 
renters perceive themselves as absorbing only about 20 percent of any property tax increase". 
However, Lovell (1978, p. 491) asserted that "...renters perceive that landlords shift onto them a 
relatively large portion of the property tax", whilst Gronberg (1980, p. 451) observed that "...the 
effects of property tax differentials on rental prices may be an implicit or hidden cost to the rental 
household", without the benefit of empirical support. Later studies (Heyndels and Smolders, 1994; 
Dollery and Worthington, 1995) verified these findings, whilst Moomau and Morton (1992, p. 179) 
found evidence of variability in the illusionary influence, "...the higher the price of the rental 
contract, the more likely it is that renters will perceive...the property tax burden". 
Accordingly, the renter illusion hypothesis explains the systematic relationship between the 
proportion of non-owner occupiers in a jurisdiction and the level of expenditure via the use of 
misperceptions in tax prices. All other things being equal, renters will perceive a lower tax price for 
the publicly provided good, demand a higher level of expenditures and accordingly fiscal outcomes 
will be greater than those anticipated in the absence of illusionary influences.  
Renter Rationality 
Despite the strong support of the renter illusion hypothesis since Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), 
most studies have given either implicit or explicit consideration of the alternate hypothesis of 
"renter rationality". In this approach, the apparent link between a jurisdictions proportion of renters 
and the systematic increase in expenditures is the result of rational, informed decisions on the 
behalf of voters, rather than any misperceptions of relevant fiscal parameters. Studies of the former 
hypothesis may be divided into: early approaches that supported rational type-behaviour (Barr and 
Davis, 1966; Hanushek, 1975; Beck, 1984; Brazer and McCarty, 1987); those that qualified 
findings on renter illusion (Peterson, 1975; Oates, 1988; Heyndels and Smolders, 1994); and those 
that directly attack the theoretical foundations of renter illusion (Martinez-Vazquez, 1983; 1988). 
More generally, they may be discussed in terms of the incidence and distribution of property taxes 
amongst voters. 
First, Barr and Davis (1966) argued that the market for rental properties would be unaffected 
by modifications in property tax. Given that the supply of such properties was fixed in the short run, 
and the demand for rental property did not depend on the tax rate, they proposed inter alia  that the 
property tax change would not be passed on to renters. "In addition, the long run is indeed long in 
terms of tax shifting since sufficient time must be allowed for the tax to prevent what would have 
otherwise been a non-negligible addition to the stock of rental properties" (Barr and Davis, 1966, p. 
152). We can see that the absence of effective shifting of property taxes onto renters, in both the 
short and long run, ensures a lower tax price for renters, and voter outcomes consistent with rational 
decisions.  
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Following Barr and Davis (1966), the issue of property tax-rent shifting has received some 
attention in the literature. Oates (1988) proposes certain circumstances where the burden of tax-
expenditure increases would be shifted onto tenants as against owners. "If the higher revenues are 
associated with improved local services, then the tax-expenditure increase should translate into a 
higher demand for rental housing...that will drive up rents" (Oates, 1988, p. 72). However, Oates 
(1988, p. 72) adds that where "tax differentials do not reflect service differentials" and where 
"leases for tenants may introduce substantial time lags into the process of tax shifting" there is a 
reduction in the present discounted value of any tax increase - the burden of tax may remain on the 
lessor. Peterson (1975) and Hanushek (1975) have also addressed the issue of tax-shifting, and 
more particularly in the case of the former, the role of time lags in rental contracts. Alternatively, a 
paper by Carroll and Yinger (1994, p. 310) estimated that "...tenants are willing to pay higher rents 
to receive the better services purchased by higher property taxes [but] are indifferent to an increase 
in the property tax because the benefits...are exactly offset by an increase in rent".8 Whilst much of 
the empirical work remains to be done, there does appear to be some evidence that "renters may, in 
fact, have significantly lower tax-prices than do owner occupants" (Oates, 1988, p. 73). 
Second, a somewhat related renter rationality argument has been proposed by Martinez-
Vazquez (1983). Quite apart from the plausible arguments that  renters differ from owner-occupiers 
in terms of both income (for instance, since renters have lower incomes they benefit from the 
progressive incidence of fiscal budgets) and general preference for public goods (for example, 
renters tend to have more school-age children) Martinez-Vazquez (1983, p. 244) proposes that the 
voting behaviour of renters will vary because they have a lower level of housing consumption 
expenditure, holding income constant. Given that "property taxes are usually levied proportionately 
to the consumption of housing" (Heyndels and Smolders, 1994, p. 329) any increase in expenditure 
on the publicly-provided good will entail larger net benefits to renters than homeowners of the same 
income level (Martinez-Vazquez, 1983, p. 244). If we assume that renters vote rationally, increases 
in expenditure will be the result of such considerations, not renter illusion. In fact, such an outcome 
will be enhanced where renters have stronger preferences for the public good (benefits vary) or 
where full tax shifting has not occurred. Accordingly, the lower the level of housing consumption 
expenditure or income for renters compared to owner-occupiers, and the higher the level of benefits 
of the former, the more likely voter outcomes are consistent with rational behaviour.9 Whilst "the 
possibility of a certain degree of fiscal illusion in renter's behaviour cannot be excluded...[the 
present argument] provides sufficient bases to question the predominance, if not the validity, of the 
fiscal illusion hypothesis in explaining renters' behaviour" (Martinez-Vazquez, 1983, p. 244). 
The Martinez-Vazquez and Sjoquist Hypothesis 
The final approach to renter behaviour has been proposed by Martinez-Vazquez and Sjoquist 
(1988). In this model, even when income and tastes are accounted for, renters and owner-occupiers 
will behave differently when faced with fiscal decisions. Essentially, what has not been included in 
previous studies of property tax incidence is that renters have the option of either paying a rental 
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payment that incorporates a higher property tax or "opting" out of a jurisdiction's fiscal system - 
that is, relocating. Owner-occupiers on the other hand are likely to incur a capital loss "...arising 
from the capitalisation of excessive public spending into their home values" (Martinez-Vazquez and 
Sjoquist, 1988, p. 429). As such, with property tax financing "...homeowners have an incentive to 
support efficient levels of government service provision" whereas renters "...with prompting from 
budget maximising bureaucrats could support an oversupply of the government service" (Martinez-
Vazquez and Sjoquist, 1988, p. 429). In a sense, the Martinez-Vazquez and Sjoquist (1988) 
argument is one that depends on neither renter illusion nor rationality. 
Limitations and Future Research 
 Surveying the literature on approaches to renter behaviour yields a number of issues. First, 
regardless of the assumptions underlying renter behaviour, and even when income and tastes are 
accounted for, "ignoring the renter-homeowners status is likely to introduce specification biases" 
(Martinez-Vazquez and Sjoquist, 1988, p. 430). That is, there is evidence to suggest that renters 
form enough of a deviation from the usual assumptions of homogeneity in the median voter model 
to impact significantly upon fiscal outcomes. Second, whilst renter illusion has been criticised "...as 
a convenient ad hoc explanation for empirical results" (Martinez-Vazquez and Sjoquist, 1988, p. 
430), there is no firm evidence supporting either of the alternative hypotheses. Perhaps, no study 
could possibly attain such a result until the psychological "black box" in which voting decisions are 
made is more fully understood. Thirdly, and bearing in mind the previous issues, whilst there still 
exist reasons to believe that median voter models of public finance encompass unreasonable 
assumptions as to the homogeneity of voter groups, more detailed analysis of community 
composition is valuable. Finally, whilst the approaches used offers tantalising support for the 
systematic impact of renter behaviour on the provision of public goods in general, it has hitherto 
been unable to discriminate fully between the main alternative hypotheses, namely renter illusion 
and renter rationality (Martinez-Vazquez, 1983).  
 The past and current research on the renter/homeowner dichotomy suggests that much 
research remains to be done on these topics. First, it may well be that the public finance-based 
median voter model forms an excessive abstraction from reality. More particularly, preferential and 
compulsory voting systems, state-based regulation, and heterogeneity in renters (public housing, 
private sector) and homeowners (owner-occupiers, mortgagees) may defy parameterisation. An 
alternative that suggests itself is the use of survey data to highlight actual differences between 
renters and homeowners (Schokkaert, 1987; Gibbs and Kemp, 1993). Whilst this approach certainly 
has limitations - not the least being the severance of the link between voting and fiscal outcomes, 
and a fortiori  the failure to address the psychological "black box" in which voting decisions are 
made - it does provide a general framework for analysing median voter results.10 Moreover, 
"despite the traditional economist's suspicion against this method [survey], there are now already 
many good examples in the economic literature" (Schokkaert, 1987, p. 176). Second, it would be 
useful to examine how increases in local government fees, charges and rates are capitalised into 
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rental payments. All other things being equal, excessive lags in the capitalisation of these charges 
are likely to sever the perceptable linkages between governmental revenue and expenditure. Finally, 
the general implications of relatively mobile renter households for local governments needs to be 
examined. Such a need is especially timely given the level of Australian interstate migration. 
AN AUSTRALIAN POLICY CONTEXT 
The policy implications that may be drawn from the above analysis are threefold. First, the 
public finance “benefit principle” states that the tax payment for a public good/service should equal 
the value of the benefit received by an individual who consumes the public good/service. 
Accordingly, if renter rationality does predominate, and the incidence of property taxation (rates) is 
lower for renters than homeowners, than the structure of Australian local government finance 
should be reexamined. More particularly, one could draw a case on such grounds for fiscal 
extraction devices more consistent with the benefit principle - notably, fees, charges, localised sales 
and income taxes; see, for instance, attempts at introducing a “poll tax” in Britain. In fact, since the 
bulk of property tax revenues finance services which are only causally associated with property 
ownership, the benefit principle is unlikely to provide an uncontestable rationale for property 
taxation; even in the absence of differences in renter/homeowner behaviour.  
 Second, if renter illusion dominates renter behaviour, then the level of provision of local 
government services is likely to be greater than that desired by a jurisdiction’s citizens. By all 
accounts, this inefficient outcome arises from the systematic underestimation of property rates by 
renter households. Once again, the limitations of property taxation as a means of financing local 
government are apparent. However, given the “extensive political support for a progressive 
property based tax” and the “universal use of property tax at the local level”, the need therefore 
arises for more “transparent” rate assessment (AURDR, 1994a, p. 21). This could be addressed by 
rates being listed as a separate item on rental payments, in much the same manner as a value-added 
tax, or being borne directly by the renters themselves. Both methods are likely to engender a greater 
sense of fiscal awareness amongst renters; though some administrative difficulties are likely to be 
associated with matching residential leases and rate assessment notices. 
 Third, the case exists that even if the incidence of property tax for renters is identical to that 
of homeowners, renters may have higher requirements for public goods, holding income constant. 
This issue is particularly pertinent for the state-based Local Government Grants Commissions’ 
(LGGCs) role in implementing Australia’s local government grants system.11 Notably, given that 
the underlying principles of these bodies include (i) the allocation of funds as far as practicable, on 
a full horizontal equalisation basis, and (ii) the assessment of expenditure needs and disabilities, the 
renter/homeowner dichotomy should be addressed.12 Put differently, communities possessing a 
greater than average proportion of renters are likely to incur positive expenditure disadvantages, 
and therefore grants to these communities should reflect these conditions. Whilst LGGCs do take 
account of a number of socio-economic disadvantages, such as the proportion of the population 
from non-English speaking and Aboriginal backgrounds, no attempt is made to include differences 
 11
in occupancy status. Indeed, this deficiency is particularly pronounced given that many LGGCs do 
not take account of per capita income; a condition somewhat off-set by the inclusion of 
occupational classifications. 
CONCLUSION 
A number of points emerge from the present study. Firstly, a significant body of empirical 
study suggests that a systematic relationship exists between the proportion of renters in a given 
fiscal jurisdiction and the level of governmental expenditures. To account for this finding, the 
public finance literature has advocated the conflicting hypotheses of renter illusion - the systematic 
misperception of fiscal parameters by renters - and renter rationality - that renters correctly perceive 
these fiscal parameters. Secondly, whilst separate policy prescriptions are possible for both 
approaches, the fundamental problem is the suitability of property taxation as a local government 
fiscal extraction device. That is, apart from practicalities such as the need to maintain consistency in 
the base and market values of assessed property, property taxation apparently fails to engender a 
sense of fiscal awareness amongst non-property owners. Moreover, even in the absence of 
illusionary influences, property taxation is unlikely to be an efficient nor equitable source of 
finance, especially where relatively mobile renter households dominate.  
 
NOTES 
1  The median voter literature is extensive, certainly to the extent of preventing any cursory survey. 
For early applications and issues see Borcherding, T.E. and Deacon, R.T. 1972. The Demand for 
the Services of Non-Federal Governments. American Economic Review  62, 842-853; 
Bergstrom, T.C. and Goodman, R.P. 1973. Private Demands for Public Goods. American 
Economic Review  63, 280-296; and Romer, T. and Rosenthal, H. 1979. The Elusive Median 
Voter. Journal of Public Economics  12, 143-170. 
2  The most common use of community composition in public finance is as a "taste" variable in 
demand estimation. A more recent alternative is that proposed by Hamilton (1983), Schwab and 
Zampelli (1987) and Holtz-Eakin (1992) where the unit costs of public good provision depend 
on community characteristics, particularly income. 
3  The literature on renter behaviour defines those either owning or purchasing their home as 
owner-occupiers or homeowners, whilst those leasing their residences are described as renters or 
tenants. 
4  "Some of the studies use as their independent variable the percentage owner occupied in the 
jurisdiction [as against the proportion or percentage renter occupied]. In a statistical or 
conceptual sense, however, it is immaterial which of the two variables is used (Martinez-
Vazquez, 1983, p. 244). 
5  Another hypothesis which implies a public expenditure demand larger than that implied by 
individual interests is that of "public regardingness". Inclination to support higher expenditures 
in this approach is neither strictly rational (in terms of self-interest) nor the result of 
misperceptions (Hanushek, 1973; Martinez-Vazquez, 1981) 
6  The use of such a measure is  also apparently consistent with "average voter" or "weighted 
average voter" models of public sector behaviour, where "...the demands of all individuals in the 
community influence the public budget"(Holtz-Eakin, 1992, p. 17). 
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7 Efficiency aspects of property taxation are also addressed in Hochman (1981), Bucovetsky 
(1982), Krelove (1993) and Pogodzinski and Sjoquist (1993). 
8  The situation where the property tax is a benefit tax - that is, the tax burden coincides with the 
benefits from the services it finances - has received some attention in the literature. See Carroll 
and Yinger (1994) for a recent analysis. A somewhat related issue is the dynamics of decisions 
to either buy or rent a house - Weiss (1978) and Henderson and Ioannides (1989) provide 
examples of this kind of work. 
9  Martinez-Vazquez (1983, p. 245) proposed that the differential in net benefits would be reduced 
by the deductibility of mortgage and property tax payments in state/federal taxes and increased 
by the passing on of depreciation allowances in the form of lower rents. 
10  Putting aside the well-known advantages and disadvantages of the median voter model  using 
actual outputs or expenditure (Holtz-Eakin, 1992), the alternatives of referendum voting and 
direct survey pose their own problems for public finance analysis. First, whilst referendum 
results are an "...explicit statement of community preferences...it is not possible to relate 
characteristics of an individual to his actual vote" (Hanushek, 1975, p. 124). Accordingly, it is 
necessary to match aggregate voting behaviour and group characteristics, as in traditional 
median voter models. Second, whereas surveys do allow direct assessment of attitudes to public 
expenditure, they are compromised by "...the validity of the response in terms of true, underlying 
preferences" (Holt-Eakin, 1975, p. 124). The main advantage of survey techniques is that a 
"richer" set of preferences and socio-economic constraints may be evaluated, as against both 
individual or aggregate voting outcomes (Schokkaert, 1987).  
11  Suitable surveys of Australian local government funding methodologies may be found in 
AURDR (1994a; 1994b). 
12  All federal systems are characterised by fiscal imbalances. These fiscal imbalances, whether 
vertical - that different levels of government have differing capacities to raise revenues to match 
spending - or horizontal - that a federation's constituent bodies likewise have diverse capacities 
and costs in the provision of public services - tend to dominate the choice of grants structure. 
The principle adopted for Australian local governments in this regard is that of full horizontal 
equalisation - grant funding is directed to communities where services are more expensive to 
provide or where residents are disadvantaged. Part of this process is the assessment of 
expenditure needs and disabilities - factors beyond an individual council’s control that could 
impact upon the equitable provision of local government services. 
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